What This Blog Is Not About
The refugee disaster and the EU’s mismanagement of it have been what I’ve following up on since 215. Notably the EU-Turkey migration deal (March 2016) and Poland and Hungary’s place on the EU’s refugee quota system (2017) have been underneath my radar.
Now that the Turkish aspect announced to have suspended the readmission agreement, upon the European Council’s determination to impose sanction on Turkey over its drilling actions within the Japanese Mediterranean, which may have expanded in the direction of the west of Cyprus and northeast of Cyprus.
While nevertheless Hungary and Poland keep their anti-immigration positions since 2017 when the EU introduced a quota system to relocate asylum seekers among the EU Member States for processing of refugee claims. It was then primarily Hungary and Poland that have refused to admit a single refugee from this scheme. These two nations, as of at the moment, stand towards any improvement on the EU degree, which might contribute to the consolidation of the Widespread European Asylum Coverage.
Additionally, nations like Hungary and Poland don’t take pleasure in a rosy relationship with Brussels over their stand and selections over immigration. For example, late July the European Fee referred Hungary to the European Courtroom of Justice and is opening infringement proceedings towards it for refusing to feed migrants who have been denied asylum.
At the moment, I am not curious about blogging on the present state of affairs regarding these points. I wish to shed some lights on the EU’s steady troubles with Turkey, Hungary and Poland over immigration control by a sneak and peek at the background of EU-Turkey deal and Poland and Hungary’s position on the EU’s relocation scheme. I’ll do that by contemplating the Member of European Parliament’s positions on these matters through the use of the outcomes of an internet e-mail interview I’ve carried out with the Members of the European Parliament, 2014-2019.
Insights into my Online E-mail Interview Expertise
Let me first offer you some insights into my online e-mail interview experience earlier than I move into explaining my findings and why is it necessary to write about it.
Virtually two years in the past, I e-mailed a set of 10 questions to every single one of the 750 MEPs and reminded those who didn’t respond after six weeks with one other e-mail. It was the shortest survey I might conduct so that I might improve the response price. In any case, it took me months to e-mail every single MEP for the first time after which additional time was spent on it to make the final contact.
Lots of you already know that amassing main knowledge is the least painless part of educational analysis. Notably those that research political establishments and political events would sympathise with me about how troublesome it is for junior teachers to succeed in out to the practitioners. I mean the Members of the European Parliament, in this instance. Thus don’t be stunned once I inform you that I had a poor response price: 11 MEPs out of 750. It’s small pattern measurement for a analysis paper, however I feel it isn’t for a blog.
What This Blog Is About
I had three goals in conducting this brief survey; it does sound lots, but given the intricacies of the world of analysis, it is a truthful endeavour.
(a) Firstly I aimed to learn how and why the EU prioritised decreasing the circulate of the refugees towards the defence and safety of human rights and democracy in Turkey. Subsequently first asked the MEPs in the event that they supported Turkey-EU deal and why they assume the EU made a such a cope with Turkey no matter its poor report of human rights report and democratic backsliding.
My findings present that seven out of 11 weren’t proud of the EU-Turkey deal, which might be interpreted as the MEPs weren’t in help of this deal in the first place. Once I asked why the deal was signed, majority of the MEPs didn’t connect the deal to democracy and human rights in Turkey, however the half of it handled the deal as a measure taken by the EU to curtail the rise of the Eurosceptic and populist political events.
While for the rest of the interviewees, the deal was signed to scale back the move of the refugees. It was as simple as that, for them. Whereas only two out of the 11 confirmed that geopolitical and economic interests are often subordinate to the protection of democracy and human rights for the EU as far as the EU overseas coverage involved.
These outcomes are vital as it highlights on not solely why the EU signed a cope with Turkey, but in addition how and why the EU prioritised the stopping the stream of immigration to the protection and defence of democracy and human rights.
Between 2015 and 2016, the Turkish authorities of the day was most criticised over its violation of human rights and its drift in the direction of aggressive democracy. No matter this, having the EU signed the cope with the Turks made all marvel concerning the EU’s position of promoting and defending democracy and human rights.
Thus, so far as Turkey’s current try and droop the deal is worried, the EU shouldn’t be stunned about Turkey’s motion. I consider when a country is treated as business as regular when they’re at their worst state of democracy and human rights, they will assume they will get away not solely with drilling within the Japanese Mediterranean but in addition with the suspension of the EU-Turkey deal.
One thing that the EU might do subsequent time when it’s confronted with comparable circumstances once more is that it should stand as much as the safety and defence of democracy and human rights and uncover artistic ways in dealing with comparable crises.
The opposite point I wish to make was when the EU prioritised the curbing the rise of the Euroscepticism; it strategy didn’t pay off nicely. As we have now seen in Might’s European Parliaments elections, political parties of this type gained more than 70 seats within the EP, forming the Id and Democracy Political Group, not counting these Eurosceptic MEPs, who did not be a part of this group.
As an alternative, the approval of the EU-Turkey deal offered the Eurosceptic and far-right political parties/ actions with more materials to work on. They used the EU’s flexibility in the protection and defence of democracy and human rights into supporting their Eurosceptic discourse and narrative about how and why the EU must change.
(b) I enquired what the MEPs considered Hungary and Poland’sposition on the EU’smigration quota scheme and their lack of solidarity for sharing the burden of immigration. ThusI requested them if the EU, then, was right in contemplating to implement sanctions on Hungary and Poland over refusing to take on refugees.
Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło and Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán at a joint news conference in Warsaw | Jacek Turczyk/EPA
I observed that 9 out of 11 respondents famous that Hungary and Poland’sposition have been unfair. Additionally, virtually half of the MEPs have been in favour of imposing sanctions on Hungary and Poland, the other half recommended in having a standard answer for the migration and asylum points.
Interview outcomes indicate that the MEPs were not pleased about how Hungarian and the Polish administrations were not cooperating with the EU institutions. I understand how the MEPs had combined feelings about what actions to take towards nations that might not comply with the EU’s widespread policy decisions.
Additionally, I discovered these interview results useful in identifying a stance that the EU might have adopted on the time, which is to concurrently (i) impose sanctions on to those nations that might not comply with the widespread selections and (ii) search for widespread options for the immigration and asylum challenge.
On this method, nations like Hungary, Poland and even Turkey would have discovered that there might be penalties if they do not adjust to the EU’s widespread policy decisions. Thus the EU might have been in a unique place now about these nations.
Plus the EU’s referral of Hungary to the ECJ might learn as an motion that ought to have been exploited earlier. The EU’s inaction and passiveness of years have allowed nations like Hungary to starve its migrants who have been denied asylum. I consider Brussels have some self-reflection to make about where they’ve been fallacious/sluggish and what steps they might take any more to rectify their unforgivable slip-ups.
(c) Thirdly, I was aspired to spotlight whether or not the MEPs thought the EU’smanagement of the refugee crisis was a hit. Given the on EU’songoing problems with the EU’smigration and asylum policy, I used to be stunned to witness that almost half of the MEPs thought the EU’smanagement of the refugee disaster was a hit, while the remaining handled it as a failure.
Moreover, when asked why they thought the EU has failed in managing the refugee crisis, all of them agreed that it was not the European Commission or the European Parliament responsible, however the Member States and their lack of solidarity in sharing the burden.
What’s fascinating concerning the MEPs defending the EU establishments is that they haven’t been goal since they are members of an EU establishment, EP. I feel had they taken an lively and productive half in managing the refugee crisis; the Member States might have been made to comply.
Furthermore, there’s nothing new about either the EU institutions blaming the MSs or the MSs criticising the EU institutions when something goes flawed on the EU degree.
Having stated that I feel the pursuits of the EU establishments and the EU MSs are irreversibly intertwined; thus, it’s virtually unimaginable to untangle their interactions to work out about whom in charge.
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